
CEDAR CREEK. 

POPULAR HISTORY REFUTED.; 



A PAPER READ BEFORE 

THE IOWA COMMANDERY 

MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION 
OF THE UNITED STATES. 



BY 

CAPTAIN E. D. HADLEY, 

DES MOINES, IOWA. 



DES MOINES : 

THE KENYON PRESS. 

1 898. 



.^ 




'VT 




j^^i/i^^LjjX>r^_^ 



G I\ 




/L4 jryt^-iT 



CEDAR CREEK 

POPULAR HISTORY REFUTED. 



A PAPER READ BEFORE 

THE IOWA COMMANDERY 

MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION 
OF THE UNITED STATES. 



BY 

CAPTAIN E. D. HADLEY, 

(I 

DES MOINES, IOWA. 



DES MOINES : 
THE KENYON PRESS. 

1898. 



El4-'-|q 



3^ 

Mr 



Copyright, iSgj, 

Iowa Conmiandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion 

of the United States. 






l^i 



THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 

POPULAR HISTORY REFUTED. 



BY CAPTAIN E. D. HADLEY. 

Cedar Creek in the East, and Shiloh in the West, have common 
features peculiar to themselves. 

Cedar Creek opened with a surprise ; so did Shiloh. At 
Cedar Creek the surprised troops were said to be asleep ; so at 
Shiloh. Cedar Creek opened with a ojreat disaster ; so did 
Shiloh. Cedar Creek ended with a glorious victory for the 
Union army ; so did Shiloh. Cedar Creek was won with a 
powerful reenforcement ; so was Shiloh ; but Cedar Creek's 
reenforcement was of one man ; Shiloh's of many thousands. 
Cedar Creek has furnished innumerable discussions and con- 
flicts of testimony ; so has Shiloh. Cedar Creek, some say, 
would have been won without the reenforcement of Phil Sheri- 
dan ; Shiloh, some say, would have been won without the reen- 
forcement of General Buell's army. 

Which battle, Cedar Creek or Shiloh, has been the most 
fruitful subject for historical comment, magazine and newspa- 
per articles and camp-fire eloquence, no one can determine. 

The pens of a legion of historians have been busied with the 
battle of Cedar Creek, fought on the 19th day of October, 1864. 

They have written from the standpoints of Union and Seces- 
sion, of soldier and civilian, of the private and the officer. 
Veterans of every rank have tried their hands, from the hisfh 
private to General Grant himself. 

They have differed much and there are differences apparently 
irreconcilable. There are fundamental differences and differ- 



4 War Sketches and Incidents. 

ences that are immaterial. Errors concerning: some matters of 
importance have become so deeply rooted in the popular mind 
as to be, perhaps, ineradicable. 

And yet there are certain salient features of this battle about 
■which there exists no controversy ; such as the fact of a disaster 
in the morning, the retrograde movement of the army, the 
"halt" and "about face," the arrival of Sheridan, the advance 
of our lines in the afternoon and the complete defeat of the 
Rebels before night-fall. 

But the means and the manner of the accomplishment of 
these events, the degree of disaster, the quality of the soldierly 
conduct of our different corps, the personal direction and the 
influence of certain general officers, have been the subjects of 
interminable disputations. 

It may be plausibly said that these disputed points are of 
minor importance since the main and essential points are con- 
ceded and the result is a matter of history. But while the good 
name of men is important and the renown of their corps and 
divisions is, in part, their own and will become that of their 
descendants, and these things are involved in these disputed 
points, they become matters of major importance. 

It is no part of the design of this paper to add to the great 
number of accounts of this battle. But it seems necessary to 
the intelligible discussion of testimony that is to follow that a 
brief outline of the situation of the armies and of the battle be 
given before proceeding further. 

The Union army was composed of the Nineteenth Corps, form- 
ing the center, with its front line behind breastworks, on the 
easterly side of Cedar Creek, which follows a southerly course, 
the breastworks conforming to the general direction of the 
moderately high bluffs on whose brows they were constructed ; 
the Eighth Corps, or Army of West Virginia, to the left and in 
advance of the Nineteenth Corps, its First Division one and one- 
sixth miles distant, likewise on bluffs overlooking the creek, 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. c 

behind breastworks, but its other division one-half mile to the 
rear and one-fourth mile from the left of the Nineteenth Corps, 
without breastworks, also on bluffs or high knolls with ravines 
intervening between its position and the position of its First 
Division and the position of the Nineteenth Corps, all of which 
ground consisted of openings and timber tracts, there being 
timber in front of part of the Eighth Corps line ; the Sixth 
Corps on the right and rear of the Nineteenth Corps a full half 
mile distant ; three divisions of cavalry, two beyond the right 
of the infantry and one far to the left rear, except one brigade 
at a ford of the Shenandoah two miles northeast of the First 
Division of the Eighth Corps — with numerous batteries of 
artillery. 

The Union position was thus on the eastern bank of Cedar 
Creek, just above its confluence with the Shenandoah River, 
whose general course was northeast and which, just opposite 
our left, closely skirts the steep northerly base of the Massa- 
nutten Mountain. 

The Confederate Army was to the southwest, five and a half 
miles distant, at Fisher's Hill, also on the northwesterly side 
of the Shenandoah River, and consisted of five divisions of 
infantry, a good force of cavalry and artillery. There exist 
no exact returns of the strength of these armies for that day, 
but without doubt the Union Army was considerably the 
stronger. 

The Confederate commander was Jubal A. Early, lieutenant- 
general by the grace of the de facto Confederate States 
government. 

General Sheridan, the commander of the Union Army, was at 
Winchester, in rear of his army, having returned thus far from 
a conference with Secretary Stanton, at Washington, assured 
by a courier from General Wright, of the Sixth Corps, in com- 
mand of the Union Army by right of seniority, that all was 
quiet at the front, on the eighteenth, in the evening, with a 



6 War Sketches and hicidents. 

reconnoissance ordered for the morning of the nineteenth, the 
eventful day. 

These were the positions and the conditions of the arnaies the 
night before the battle. 

But while Sheridan slept the sound sleep of a tired horseman 
at Winchester, Early and his forces were beginning the execu- 
tion of a daring piece of strategy, whose object was the sur- 
prise and destruction of the Union Army, a result which would 
have given Early sweet revenge for the galling defeats, three 
in number, he had suffered at the hands of Sheridan and his 
army within thirty days. 

Selecting Gordon's, Ramseur's and Fegram's Divisions, and 
a brigade of cavalry, under command of Gordon, Early dis- 
patched them as a flanking column, immediately after dark. 
Crossing the Shenandoah, stealing along by tortuous paths so 
narrow that they could proceed only in single file, Gordon's 
command, at half past four in the morning, crossed the river a 
second time, putting to flight, with a few shots, the cavalry 
picket at the ford, and formed in the rear and on the left of the 
Union line, where, in a five minutes charge, they could reach 
the Second Division of the Eighth Corps. 

Starting at one o'clock in the morning, Kershaw's Rebel Divi- 
sion advanced directly toward the Union center by the valley 
pike, deflecting to the right and halting on the Strasburg side 
of the creek, threatening the Union left in its front. 

Wharton's Rebel Division was halted on the pike, one thou- 
sand yards in front of the Union center. 

The "pike" was the broad macadamized road "from Win- 
chester town," running many miles up the valley and passing 
through the Union position at the left of the Nineteenth Corps. 

Kershaw's Division, accompanied by Early himself, arrived 
in sight of the Union camp at 3:30 o'clock, and could see the 
tents of their unsuspecting foes on the opposite hills, bathed in 
the light of the hunter's moon. 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. j 

As one historian has said, " The situation was intensely dra- 
matic. There crouched Kershaw's Division of Confederates 
under cover, ready to spring upon Crook's sleeping camps in 
front. Wharton's Division was watching for an opportunity 
to wedge itself between Crook's right and the Nineteenth Corps, 
while Gordon's three divisions crept cautiously and in silence 
along in the shadow of the mountain to gain our army's rear 
and strike the fatal blow ; and there lay in their tents the 
Union Army, totally unconscious that an active and stealthy 
foe was close at hand, in the actual execution of a well laid 
plan for its destruction." 

At half past four, Kershaw's Division, at the concerted 
signal of Gordon's fire upon the cavalry pickets at the ford of 
the Shenandoah, crossed the creek and rapidly formed and 
advanced against the breastworks of Crook's First Division, 
which they reached, if Early's statement is correct, at precisely 
five o'clock. Although various officers of the Eighth Corps 
who were with their commands in this First Division, and many 
soldier writers who heard the volleys of this attack from their 
various places in different parts of the army, set the hour of 
this attack at various points of time, from 4:30 to 5:iO, it is 
probable that Early would have the most accurate knowledge, 
as he was directing an intricate military operation, and this was 
the initial assault of several inter-dependent assaults, and was 
the move he was waiting for. 

The accounts of the final advance of the Union forces in the 
afternoon state it to have occurred at points of time more vari- 
ant than the accounts of this morning's assault. These vari- 
ances of time are unimportant. 

This assault, made nearly an hour before sunrise, in a thick 
fog, in darkness so great that the flashes of the guns were seen 
by men "standing to arms" in the Nineteenth Corps, resulted 
in the utter discomfiture of this division of the Eighth Corps, 
the hasty withdrawal of these regiments with their organiza- 



8 War Sketches and Incidents. 

tion somewhat shattered, but with many regiments able to take 
new positions in order, with the troops of the Nineteenth Corps 
to face the enemy until that corps was compelled to withdraw 
to the rear. 

Several guns were lost here and several hundred men were 
captured. 

Kershaw's lines, reformed, followed quickly toward the left 
flank of the Nineteenth Corps, pursued and pursuers moving 
over very broken ground. 

To meet the oncoming conquerors of Thoburn's Division, the 
Nineteenth Corps was extended to the left by pushing a brigade 
and a half across the pike. Hayes' division and the fractional 
division of Kitching of the Eighth were placed in line beyond 
the Nineteenth, parallel to and at a short distance from the pike, 
but east of it. Meanwhile Gordon's three divisions are sweep- 
ing westward, and unexpectedly swoop down upon the left of this 
line and crush it in. Here and now, according to General 
Wright's, and General Crook's and Colonel Hayes' official 
reports, before the Rebel assault became pressing, or their fire 
severe, an unreasoning and uncontrollable panic seized the men 
of this Second Division, and, in spite of commands and entreat- 
ies, the majority of the men left the lines in disorderly retreat, 
some, however, remaining around the regimental colors and 
fighting valiantly so long that the Rebel lines were held back 
until the headquarters trains were, for the most part, withdrawn 
in safety. If this panic was unexplainable, it had its counter- 
part in the conduct of Kershaw's and Ramseur's Rebel Divisions, 
when, during the Union advance in the afternoon, according to 
Early, upon the discomfiture of Gordon's Division on the Rebel 
left, the men in the other two divisions named, broke from the 
ranks without orders and were seized with a panic in which, for 
the most part, they refused to obey orders and rushed to the 
rear and ruined all. 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. g 

The left of the Nineteenth Corps here suflfered severely and 
was forced back. The men of both corps had cause for a 
panicky feeling if they realized that the lines of Gordon's, Ker- 
shaw's and Wharton's advance were all converging upon the 
position they were holding, front, flank and rear, with crushing 
force. 

General Wright states that he ordered the Sixth Corps to 
form farther back, and directed General Emory to extricate 
his Nineteenth Corps from its untenable position and to form 
on the right of the Sixth. 

The report of General Wright is valueless to what orders 
he gave from this time onward to the coming of General Sheri- 
day, or as to the movements of the army during a retrogression 
which now ensued and resulted finally in a new line established 
about one and a quarter miles north of Middletown, from which 
line an advance was made in the afternoon. 

But from the reports of corps and division commanders it is 
to be gathered that a new line was formed, as the Nineteenth 
Corps retired from its works, extending from the pike westerly 
across Meadow Run toward Cedar Creek, just north of Bell 
Grove House, with the Sixth Corps on the left and the Nine- 
teenth Corps on the right, and with some of the Eighth Corps 
between, and that some Rebel assaults were repulsed here, but 
that this position soon became untenable on account of the out- 
flanking of the left by Gordon's forces at the pike, and a retro- 
grade movement was made in reasonable order, the Second 
Division of the Sixth Corps taking position on an eminence 
west of Middletown, where they repulsed at least two deter- 
mined charges, while the other two divisions of the Sixth Corps 
and the Nineteenth Corps were in an irregular line to the right, 
supported by a division of cavalry with its artillery. 

Up to about this time a thick fog had covered all things, and 
partially hidden the combatants from their foes and from 
friends as well. About this time the fog was dispelled. 



lO War Sketches a7id Incidents. 

It was now well toward nine o'clock. Withdrawing farther, 
a little later the two corps were irregularly aligned along the 
Old Forge Road, as follows : Cavalry, Nineteenth Corps, First, 
Third and Second Divisions of the Sixth Corps. 

About ten o'clock, the retrograde was resumed, bearing 
toward the pike and the cavalry, with the exception of three 
regiments, was transferred to the left, taking position on the 
left or east side of the pike north of Middletown. 

The Second Division of the Sixth Corps took position on the 
right of the pike with a considerable fraction of the Eighth 
Corps to its right, which was soon joined by the Second Brigade 
of the Third Division of the Sixth. 

There were here, then, on a line from which no further retro- 
grade was made, substantially two divisions of cavalry, num- 
bering, as some say, 7,000 or more, and probably 5,000 infan- 
try and some guns, a force capable of doing some hard fighting 
and of taking care of themselves against all the Rebels in the 
field. They were not seriously assaulted here. 

The story of the way in which the First Division and one-half 
of the Third Division of the Sixth Corps became lost (not used 
oflfensively) during the last movement and wandered a thousand 
yards through the woods beyond the selected line occupied by 
the Second Division, while the Nineteenth Corps was farther to 
the rear and farther from the pike, is exceedingly interesting 
and clears up a mystery of long standing as to how those troops 
got to the rear so far without being pressed by the enemy, but 
time is wanting for its presentation. The explanation is alto- 
gether honorable to those troops. 

It is not the design of this article to go into the details of the 
movements of the various parts of the infantry force from the 
time of the retirement of the Nineteenth Corps from its position 
at the pike to the time when Sheridan arrived and found the 
forces to the north of Middletown. Indeed, to analyze the 
reports of corps, division and brigade commanders and corre- 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. n 

late their various movements so as to present a comprehensive 
scheme that will show their relations to each other at different 
times after they left the Bell Grove line until they reached the 
Old Forgo Road, is an almost superhuman task. The country 
was in places heavily wooded, corps were unable to see each 
other though near at hand, and belts of timber intervened 
between brigades and divided divisions. Neighbors could not 
see each other for fog and woodland. 

But if credence is to be given to the reports of corps, division 
and brigade commanders, the movement of the Nineteenth Corps 
to the Bell Grove line was by no means deliberate and organi- 
zation was, in some degree, lost, as must be inferred from the 
loss of eleven guns. The narratives of individuals indicate that 
to them there was more of chaos than of order. The reports 
of officers indicate that the cohesion of brigades and divisions 
was maintained or recovered, if temporarily lost. 

Richard N. Irwin, who was an officer on General Emory's 
staff, says, in his history of the Nineteenth Corps, at this point 
in the battle, " In the stress, the men held well to their colors, 
and although there may and must have been many that fell out, 
not a brigade or regiment lost its organization for a moment." 
These are brave words. 

It is equally clear that the movements of the First and Third 
Divisions of the Sixth Corps from the Bell Grove line were not 
in perfect order, as is indicated by the loss of six guns, the last 
guns lost that day. 

Further, if we put credence in the official reports mentioned 
and narratives prepared by officers who participated in this part 
of the action, one must conclude that the movements from the 
line last named and the line opposite Middletown, where the 
fierce charges of the Rebels were repulsed, and from the Old 
Forge Road, were made in pursuance of a design well conceived 
and worked out in the mind of the general in command to take 
a new position where, with the grip of Early on our left flank 



12 War Sketches and hicide7its. 

shaken off, the battle could be fought out with a fair chance of 
success ; and we must also conclude that the force of the Rebel 
attack was spent in the charges repulsed by Getty on the west 
of Middletown about 8:30 a. m., and that the further retro- 
grade movement was made deliberately and unmolested, except 
by a comparatively harmless artillery fire. 

We may further conclude that the transfer of the cavalry to 
the left flank at ten o'clock, where it threatened to envelop 
Early's right flank, compelling him to send his freshest division 
to the right to protect that flank from the Union cavalry, was 
one of the wisest tactical moves of the day, and paralyzed 
Early's advance completely. 

We may also conclude from these reports that General Keifer, 
in command, after the morning, of the Third Division of 
the Sixth Corps, was correct in stating in his report that owing 
to the movements of the morning the divisions had been com- 
pelled to fight independently of each other. 

But if we conclude that General Merritt, of the First Cavalry 
Division, was correct in saying, after speaking of the discom- 
fiture of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps, that "Wright's 
Infantry (meaning Sixth Corps), which was farther removed from 
the point of attack, fared somewhat better but did not offer more 
than a spasmodic resistance," we must also conclude that the 
Rebel attacks were spasmodic also, because they were resisted 
as often as they assaulted after the Bell Grove line was formed. 

We may also conclude from the same evidence that Sheridan 
in his report, dated February 3, 1866, did not speak by the 
record when he said, " This (attack on Crook) was followed by 
a direct attack upon our front, and the result was that the 
whole army was driven back in confusion to a point about one 
mile north of Middletown, a very large portion of the infantry 
not even preserving a company organization." 

In his Memoirs, published in 1888, Sheridan uses much 
milder language, saying that "The whole Union Army was 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. 13 

driven from its camps in more or less disorder, and though 
much disjointed resistance was displayed, it may be said that 
no systematic stand was made until Getty's Division, aided by 
Torbert's cavalry, which Wright had ordered to the left early 
in the action, took up the ground where, on arriving from Win- 
chester, I found them.'* 

The severe fishtins: of the morning was over before Sheridan 
left Winchester, and he cannot testify to what occurred before 
half past ten o'clock, of his own knowledge, and, therefore, 
the statements of men of intelligence who were in the battle and 
in a position to know, must prevail over statements based on 
hearsav, as are all accounts deduced from the statements of 
others, however high their rank may have been. 

The statements in the Memoirs are evidently quite conserva- 
tive and fair. 

How Sheridan ordered the whole line to advance about four 
o'clock is history known to all America, and a hundred histories 
have told of the glorious victory for the Union with which the 
day ended. This matter will be left with the historians, by the 
writer, and attention will now be directed to a matter which has 
lon^ affected the soldierly reputation of the men of one corps 
of the army engaged in this battle. 

For a third of a centurv the Eighth Corps has rested under 
the suspicion that the totality of the surprise on the left was 
due to lack of vigilance, or neglect of proper precautions on 
the part of the corps commander, or division commander, or 
oflScer of the day, or to lack of watchfulness or of wakefulness 
on the picket line, or gullibility of pickets, by which they fell 
victims to the stratagems of the enemy, or to an unwarrantable 
feeling of security in that corps, or to neglect of phenomena 
presenting themselves to the pickets in the night, but which 
were not investigated, or to an illy performed reconnoissance 
from that corps on the preceding day, or to some undefined 



14 



War Sketches and Incidents. 



unsoldierly quality that had suddenly possessed some of the best 
soldiers of the Union armies. 

General Wright devotes one-fifth of his report of the battle, 
dated November 27, 1865, to an explanation of, and apology 
for, the surprise of that morning, and tries to trace it to the 
extreme feeling of security resulting from the reconnoissance 
from this corps of the day before, which, he intimates, was not 
carried to a proper distance to the front, the reconnoitering 
party reporting that the Rebel Army had retreated up the val- 
ley. But such a defense could not exonerate ; it could only 
confirm existing suspicions. 

The suspicion that all was not right on the picket line of the 
Eighth Corps has led to romantic and weird stories of pickets 
silently seized after stealthy and cat-like approaches in the dark, 
of the relief of pickets by Rebels in Union garb, of mysterious 
consciousness of invisible human presence beyond the lines, and 
the muffled tramping of marching hosts near the pickets in the 
impenetrable gloom, all of which may be passed by as idle 
imaginings, in view of the fact that the night was so bright that 
at 3:30 Early and Kershaw could see the Union camps in the 
moonlight. Besides, at the hour of the alleged mysterious 
sounds the Rebels were not within a mile of the Union pickets. 
What happened to the pickets will be told in another place. 

The fact that Early succeeded in his purpose of surprising 
the First Division cannot be seriously questioned, but the 
extent of that surprise, and the manner of it, and how it wp,s 
met, and its real consequences are worthy of investigation. 

But it is not amiss to commence this part of the discussion 
with a reference to the completeness of the agreement of his- 
torical writers in the statement that the men of the Eighth Corps 
were caught in their beds and captured in their blankets, or 
compelled to flee undressed, or half dressed, a swarm of harm- 
less fugitives, less dangerous than a disorganized mob. In all 
researches made, the writer has failed to find one historian who 



Addi'ess by Captain E. D. Hadley. jr 

does not revel in the idea that the Eighth Corps was asleep 
when the Rebels went in over the breastworks of the First 
Division. 

George E. Pond, "Campaigns of the Civil War," Shenan- 
doah Valley, page 224, says : "Long before sunrise a ringing 
volley of musketry startled the men of Thoburn'a Division 
from their sleep, and as they came bewildered from their tents 
to learn the cause, over every part of their parapet, through 
the darkness and the fog, rushed Kershaw's Infantry. The 
position was swept in an instant, with its seven guns, from 
which not a shot had been fired." 

"Lossing's Civil War," volume 3, page 369, says: "At 
early morning twilight the onler of attack was given, when the 
rattle of musketry on right, left, and rear, and the ringing 
battle shout summoned the Nationals from repose to arms. 
But before they could take position in the trenches, the assail- 
ants who had captured the pickets were there. In the space of 
fifteen minutes Crook's Corps was broken into fragments and 
sent flying in wild disorder upon the other corps." 

Pollard's "Lost Cause" (Rebel), page 559, says : "The sur- 
prise was complete. The Eighth Corps was unable to form a line 
of battle, and in five minutes was a herd of fugitives. Many of 
the men awoke only to find themselves prisoners." 

Charles Carlton Coffin, in ' Freedom Triumphant," page 49, 
says : "It was five o'clock. Gordon had crossed the Shenan- 
doah, seized the Union pickets, formed his brigades by Mr. 
Bowman's house and had crossed the fields to the breastworks 
thrown up by Thoburn's Division. They swarmed over it with 
exultant yells. The soldiers in their tents thus suddenly awak- 
ened found themselves prisoners. Some half dressed, seized 
their guns. Before the regiments of Thoburn's Division could 
form, the Confederates were upon them." 

"Harper's History of the Great Rebellion," page 712, says : 
" The five divisions had broken on front, flank and rear through 



1 6 



11 '(t/ Skcldif"^ (111(1 hnidrnls. 



Hid Hlrcpiiinr (••iinpH. Ill liricdii rniinilcH il wuh |»««i IVclly idiilrd 
and Hliciiiiiiii/j; luick in conriiHioii iipiMi llir NiiMlccnlli, iln ]i\\\w 
(•.ii|)lui«i(l niid liiriicd upon IImi rii^!;iliv<'H.'" 

Ainnridim Sii|)))l<irM(inl, to Kiic.y(!ln|M'(li!i I'lilnnnicM, iir1i<l«5, 
(!(Mlur (!r('(?l<, HJiyn : " II'ih ( l^iiiil yV) lulvjincd ccdiimns liiy vvitliin 
Hix Imndicd yiirdH nl' IIki Hlncipin^ l*\'drrjil IroopH. Mo pr<'piirn<l 
n loihl nltiick upon IJk^ llnloii i-l<j^lil iiiid Ui(t l(d'(, vvmh HiiMiiltmi 
ODUHly awnkcncid l>y llio iiihIi iiikI hIioiiIh of Mio (/Oiir<'d<'iat(iH. " 

(JriMilcy'n '' Aimwic.'Mi (^onHicI/' pJi^^'^ OI'J, volunir ti, con- 
(diiiH llin rollowin;.' rciiiiirK:il)l(! sliilriiinnls, wIik'Ii arci «;iv(in 
l)()c.iuiH() ili(iy aid in liiui vvilli llic oIIkuh (|iiot()(l vviili rc^^ard to a 
Hlcrpin/^ (Minip, UccauHd llicy conlain lliii '' I'airy Hloiy '' about 
"a ruHtlinfj; of iindiM'hniHli and a Hound of iimltiliidirKaiH tfatnp- 
in^," l)(HiaiiH(i lli<\y Hnan lo inlmd to cliar^n (Jcncial ( Vook 
Willi n<'<j;l('<'t of pi'opiir piccanlioiis, and l»ccaiis(^ soiik^ <d llicin 
>ir<> poHitiv('l>' altsurd and miliiin lo IiicIh and ail hIiow of what 
hIiiIV popular hiHloricH arc iiiad(> : 

"At '^ A. M., Ilir picUiils of tli(> P'ifdi New York Heavy 
Artillniy ( Kilrhin^'s I )i\ "mioii) licard aiiisllin;; o iindcrbnisli 
und ti Hound of luultiludiiioUM Iranipin^, and two posts wi^'o 
rt'luwiMl and Heiit into eainp with llai report, (ienoral (^look 
tJHM'eupon or(l(M'(^(l that ii (j^ood lookout he k(^pt, hul^ sont out no 
r(<eoniioi,sHanr(\ evi'ii the ;j;ap in tln' Ironl line caused l»y di^tail- 
in;j; r(^«;iiii(Mits lor picket duty w«M'e not, tilled, and when tho 
erash eaiii(\ tli(> muskets of many ol' \\w men were not ioathid. 
There was some suspicion and uiicnsiness in (Irook's command, 
hut no serious preparations. ^' * '*' The iveliels disdnin- 
in«j^ to notice the pi<k(«t tire, W(M(> themselves in the I reiiohos 
hid'om our iistonisluMl soldi(Ms (-ould occupy them in olFective 
force'. * " * In liftciMi minuti^s, the Army of Wost Vir- 
<^inia was a llyini:, uiol». ( )ii(^ hattalion of its picket lino lost 
one hundred kilhxl and wouikIimI and S(>veii hundred prisoners. '' 

'I'he b'ifth New ^'oik Heavy ArtilltMy did not helon<>; to Ivilch- 
in<r's I division, hut to 'I'liohuiiTs. I low could a " multitudinous 



Addre^% by Captain A. I). Ifadky. \n 

tramping" of Kcbcl-i be board by Tboburri'« pickets at a time 
when none of the Kebolrf were within a mile, perhapn two miles, 
of the pickets ? How could a reconnoi.ssan^;*; be w;nt out in the 
night '^ ilow could " HUBpicion and ijnea«inc»»" ari»c in a camp 
of sleeping men a little after two o'clock at night? How could 
one battalion out on picket los^j eight hundr<;^J men ? Why w^nd 
posts into camp with a report rather than s/^me ofl5c*jr ? 

The whole extract is a tissue of absurdities and misinforma- 
tion made up of idle riimors, unprofessional guess work and 
unimportant facts, but, like the other historical quotations, it 
ban gone on for many years diss^;minating worthless and worse 
than worth le.-;s ideas of the condition of Crook's command that 
foggy Oct<^;ber morning and of the result of the surprise. The 
whole number of prisoners lost by the Eighth Corf>s that day 
was less than five hundred and forty. The official rej:x^rt offers 
no evidence of the matter of the pickets in which General 
Crook's name is involved. Was it a myth ? 

A sweetly fx^etic version is given by Nicolay and Hay, 
"Abraham Lincoln," volume 9, page 317: "His (Kershaw's; 
division, veiled by the mist of the morning, poured like phan- 
toms over Crook's intrenchments, capturing seven guns and 
turning them (>x\ their flying owners, and the troops in camp 
suddenly aroused out of sleep. The gurpri.se was perfect." 

Passing from these civilian historians and their rehash of 
hearsay testimony and rumors, attention is called to the state- 
ments of certain military writers who were not of the Eighth 
Corps or nearer the Eighth that morning than the camp of the 
Nineteenth and Sixth Corps, and whose testimony is also of the 
nature of hearsay. 

Richard N. Irwin, of General Emory's staff, in his "History 
of the Ninete^^nth Corps," page 418, says, speaking of Ker- 
shaw's attack uponThoburn's Division : "Ai an in.^tant, before 
a single shot could be fired, before the muskets could be taken 
from the ntacks, before the cannoneers could reach their pieces, 



1 8 War Sketches and Incidents. 

Kershaw's men, with loud and continuous yells, swarmed over 
the parapet in Thoburn's front, seized the guns and sent his 
half -clad soldiers flying to the rear." 

General Wesley Merritt, of the First Cavalry Division, in 
"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," volume 4, page 516, 
says : "The surprise was complete. Crook's camp, and after- 
ward Emory's, were attacked in flank and rear, and the men 
and officers driven from their beds, many of them not having 
time to hurry on their clothes except as they retreated, half 
awake and terror stricken." 

No other writer has been found accusinor the Nineteenth 
Corps of being also asleep. In fact, they were " standing to 
arms " before the assault upon Crook was made. 

In "Vermont in the Civil War," volume 1, page 544, G. C. 
Benedict says ; " * -^^ (continuing) when Kershaw's solid 
lines, springing over the parapets of Thoburn's Division, woke 
his men with a rattling volley. Before the latter could go into 
line the Rebels were in their camps. The tents were dragged 
from over the heads of Thoburn's men and many of them were 
captured as they lay in their blankets. * * * Thoburn was 
killed and five hundred of his men captured, and seven pieces, 
taken without firing a shot, were turned by Kershaw on the 
terrified fugitives." 

In "Three Years in the Sixth Corps," Geo. T. Stevens, sur- 
geon of the Seventy-seventh New York Volunteers, page 421, 
says: "Toward these (Crook's lines) they (Kershaw's forces) 
hastened, and so complete was the surprise that the men of the 
Eighth Corps were, for the most part, quietly sleeping in their 
tents. The few who got into the breastworks were subjected 
to a fierce fire in the flank, and wore soon forced to abandon 
the line." 

Captain J. Franklin Fitts, One Hundred and Fourteenth 
New York, First Brigade, First Division, Nineteenth Corps, in 
an article in the Galaxy, volume 1, page 534, says : "Sleeping 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. iq 

near Long Meadow Run, 1 was aroused by a tremendous 
outburst of musketry from the far away left. The volley was 
one crashing fire into the slumbering Eighth Corps." 

Quoting now from general officers in high command, we find 
a different version of affairs. General Horatio G. Wright, 
who was in command of the army that morning, but who was 
not within a mile of the spot, says in his report : " The sur- 
prise was complete, for the pickets did not fire a shot, and the 
first indication of the enemy's presence was a volley into the main 
line, when the men were at reveille roll call, without arms." 

We learn from this report that the General did not credit 
the story of the firing into the tents of the sleeping men. But 
he alone introduces the idea of reveille roll call. General 
Wright does not agree with the officers of Thoburn's Division 
in any particular as to details. As participants in the affair, 
these officers are entitled to greater credence. 

General Crook, commander of the Eighth Corps, in his report 
dated November 7, 1864, page 365 of part I, volume 43, 
Rebellion Records, who was no nearer to this part of his lines 
that morning than the position of the Second Division, omits 
the idea of slumbering camps, but says candidly and justly : 
"At about 4:30 a. m., another force of the enemy crossed the 
creek in front of the First Division, and soon after the enemy 
came rushing in solid lines of battle, without skirmishers, on 
my pickets, coming to the works with those of the pickets they 
had not captured, in overwhelming numbers, entered that por- 
tion of the works not occupied by our troops, and soon were 
on the flanks and in the rear of the First Division and the two 
batteries, compelling them either to retreat or be captured." 

The histories and popular writings by military gentlemen 
would have lacked startling rhetorical effects if the writers had 
faithfully studied Crook's report. 

Having given ample proof from so many historical writers, 
civil and military, to show that for one-third of a century 



20 War Sketches and Incidents. 

writers of popular literature have permitted their powerful 
influence to fasten a species of obloquy upon the brave men of 
the Eic^hth Corps, both officers and rank and file, making them 
serve as a foil to draw attention away from the shortcomings, 
if any there were, of the rest of the army, the writer proposes 
to ask you to go, in imagination, into the camp of Thoburn's 
Division at about four o'clock of that eventful morning and with 
him observe the state of affairs, and whether at five o'clock the 
men werejasleep in their tents and were awakened by a "ringing 
volley" fired into their camps, and their artillery all captured 
without firing a shot, 

A careful study of the official reports of the officers of this 
division will enable us to do this, and avoid that reliance on 
hearsay which has characterized the writers quoted above. 

We find here encamped in rear of the works, which faced 
Cedar Creek to the south, seven regiments and one battalion of 
infantry, constituting the First and Third Brigades of the divi- 
sion, with two six-gun batteries and one four-gun battery. 

The First Brigade consists of the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts 
Regiment, 

Fifth New York Heavy Artillery Battalion, 

One Hundred and Sixteenth Ohio Regiment, 

One Hundred and Twenty-third Ohio Regiment. 
The Third Brigade consists of the 

Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania Regiment, 

Tenth West Virginia Regiment, 

Eleventh West Virginia Regiment, 

Fifteenth West Virginia Regiment. 
The Artillery consists of 

First Ohio Light Battery L, four guns. 

First Pennsylvania Light Battery D, six guns, 

Fifth United States Battery B, six guns. 

The division is commanded by Colonel Joseph Thoburn, one 
brigade by a colonel, the other by a lieutenant-colonel, one regi- 



k 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. 21 

ment by a colonel, two regiments by lieutenant -colonels, one by 
a major, three regiments and the battalion by captains. The 
chief of artillery is a captain. 

It is dark yet, a fog has enveloped everything since Early 
and Kershaw were looking at the Union camps at 3:30, in 
the moonlight. Objects are not distinguishable at a distance 
of more than thirty paces. There is a strip of woods in front 
of the left and some woods in the rear. The Pennsylvania Bat- 
tery is entrenched near the left of the line. The United States 
Battery is on the right and the Ohio Battery of four guns far- 
ther to the right, commanding the Cedar Creek bridge at the 
pike. There is a ravine or hollow in rear of the camp running 
down to Cedar Creek and then a hill to the north on a part of 
which the Second Division is located. The battalion of thie 
Fifth New York Heavy Artillery is on picket down by Cedar 
Creek. 

Some of the officers are astir, as Major Withers of the Tenth 
West Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Wildes of the One Hundred 
and Sixteenth Ohio, and Captain Dupont, chief of artillery, 
and probably others. 

They hear picket tiring ; some say on the right ; some say on 
the left ; same say in front. 

Some say it is four o'clock ; some say it is about half past 
four, and one says it is between five and six. Some say " early 
in the morning." They all mean the same thing and just put 
the time in their reports as it seemed to them when their reports 
were written, within a week's time. 

Skirmishing with a foe by the pickets in the dark is heard ; 
the division officer of the day reports the advance of a heavy 
force from the direction of Cedar Creek, in front. 

Captain Dupont orders the reveille sounded. There is a 
quick seizing of weapons, brief commands, hasty forming of 
companies and regiments and manning of breastworks and the 
cannoneers stand by their guns. 



22 War Sketches and Incidents. 

Colonel T. M. Harris, who commanded the Third Brigade, 
tells the story in his report as follows : 

"At about 4:30 a. m. the enemy ad/anced in heavy force 
against the works of the First Division, pushing in rapidly 
whatever of the picket line he failed to capture. The division 
having been aroused by the firing along the picket line and sub- 
sequent skirmishing of the pickets with the advancing foe, as 
also by the division officer of the day, who reported the advance 
of a heavy force, was quickly formed behind the works and put 
in position for defense as far as practicable. Very soon the 
enemy's line advanced close up to the works and were greeted 
by a volley from our whole line. The action here was sharp 
and brief, the greatly superior force of the enemy enabling him 
not only to turn our left but also to effect an entrance between 
the First and Third Brigades. Being thus subject to enfilading 
fires as also to a direct fire from the front, these two brigades 
were driven from the works." 

The report of Lieutenant-Colonel Thos, F. Wildes, One Hun- 
dred and Sixteenth Ohio, commanding the First Brigade, says : 
" About 4 o'clock in the morning of the 19th of October, 
1864, I heard brisk picket-firing on the right and left of the 
position occupied by my command. I immediately ordered the 
brigade under arms behind the fortifications. In a few minutes 
I heard a volley of perhaps twenty rifle shots and a yell as 
though a charge was being made in the direction of a picket 
post in front of ray left. I at once directed Captain Karr,' of 
my statt' to inform Col. Thoburn that there was considerable 
firing along the picket line. I then went to the right of my 
command, to a position occupied by the third brigade. First 
Division, when I discovered that some pickets were coming in. " 
He then details movements before the command was forced 
out of the works, says he formed a line of his brigade on the 
hill overlooking the ravine in the rear ; moved his command to 
the pike, fighting to the right and front, and formed his brigade 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. 23 

with the Nineteenth Corps and fouf^ht till that corps and the 
Second Division of the Army of West Virginia withdrew. 

He further says : " My command was in line of battle fully 
three-fourths of an hour before the attack was made, and the 
information was sent to division headquarters a half hour before 
the attack was made on my right." 

The report of Captain Andrew Potter, in command of the 
Thirty-fourth Massachusetts of the First Brigade, says : 

" About 4 A. M. the regiment was drawn up in line, and soon 
after picket firing was heard in the direction of the line occu- 
pied by the Fifth N. Y. H. A. In a very short time after the 
enemy was seen in front of the line of breastworks occupied by 
the first division, Dept. of W. Va., and the regiment immediately 
engaged in action with the enemy, who delivered a heavy fire 
into our front and on our right flank, opposite the position 
occupied by the 54 Pa. We continued our firing until the enemy 
were seen inside the breastworks of the 54 Pa., and also over 
the breastworks of the 5th N. Y. H. A., vacated by the regi- 
ment being on picket duty. Thus surrounded on our right and 
left, receiving a fire from the right, left and front, and the 
force on our right having retired, the order was given to 
retire and the regiment became scattered and broken." 

Major H. Kellogg, commanding the One Hundred and Twenty- 
third Ohio, in his report says : 

"We were alarmed about 4:30 o'clock in the morning by 
picket firing in our immediate front. The regiment was imme- 
diately formed behind the breastworks. After remaining a short 
time in line we were ordered to move by the right flank and 
occupy the works built by the 5th N. Y. H. A. We had hardly 
got into position before the regiments on our right were heavily 
engaged and men being driven back. After firing a few rounds 
we were ordered to move by left flank and occupy our own 
works." They formed with the brigade in the rear, as related 
by Colonel Wildes. 



24 War Sketches a7id Incidents. 

Captain John Suter, commanding the Fifty-fourth Pennsyl- 
vania, Third Brigade, in his report says : 

"On the morning of the 19th, before daylight, when I was 
first apprised of picket firing on our front, I ordered the regi- 
ment to turn out under arms, which was done by the companies 
forming in their quarters and afterward marching to the breast- 
works in front. Before the line could be properly formed, the 
enemy, apparently in a mass, were observed advancing along 
the whole front, and already at the abatis. My regiment 
opened and maintained a fire until, the enemy getting in our 
rear from the extreme left of the line of works, were com- 
pelled to fall back." He says a portion of the regiment rallied 
in the skirt of woods in the camp, and disputed the advance of 
the enemy for a time. 

Major Henry H. Withers, in command of the Tenth West 
Virginia, Third Brigade, says in his report : 

"On the morning of the 19th I was, for some reason, very 
restless, and rose much earlier than usual ; had taken ray seat 
in my tent and commenced eating my breakfast, when I heard 
several shots tired in tolerably quick succession ; thought, how- 
ever, the pickets were disturbed by some unimportant event 
until I heard a volley fired apparently from the left, where the 
second division was fortified ; then almost immediately I heard 
a volley from our part of the fortifications, when, leaving my 
breakfast, I ran to the extreme right of the line, when I 
encountered an enfilading fire from the left, and found the men 
from my regiment throwing themselves down in the trenches 
and hurrying into the works * * * seeing I could not fire 
to the left for our own men * * * The regiment then 
marched double-quick to the foot of the hill below fortifications, 
where it was formed," etc. 

Captain Van H. Bukey, commanding Eleventh West Vir 
ginia, in his report says : 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. 2S 

" Near 5 a. m. the firing on the left alarmed my camp, 
and the men were quickly in line under arras at the works, 
immediately to the left of the battery on the extreme right of 
the line. When I arrived at the works I found some of my 
men firing to the front. * * * x ordered them to cease 
firing * * * I had not passed from left to right of my 
regiment, however, before the 15 W. Va., on my left, fell 
back from the works, and my flank received a pretty severe, 
but, owing to the fog and darkness, not accurate fire. My 
regiment then gave way by companies from the left obliquing 
to the right and rear down the hill. Moved " by right of 
companies to rear" having formed a perfect line (across ravine 
toward pike), formed column and filed to rear of left of 19th 
corps." His organization disappeared when the 19th corps 
fell back. 

Lieutenant William Munk, of Battery D, First Pennsylvania, 
in his report says : 

"On the morning of the 19th of October, 1864, at reveille, 
as was then the custom, my cannoneers went to their posts at 
the guns : preseutl}' several musket shots were heard in the 
direction of my front. This was the only intimation of an 
enemy near at hand until they were discovered advancing in 
line of battle not twenty yards from my battery. I immedi- 
ately opened fire on them with cannister, firing some fifteen 
rounds, when the infantry supports on my left offering but 
little resistance, the enemy were enabled to reach the inside of 
the works, and after firing a volley charged the battery w^ith 
fixed bayonets, and with clubbed muskets drove the cannoneers 
from their pieces." 

Captain Henry A. Dupont, chief of artillery for Battery B, 
Fifth United States Artillery, reported as follows : 

" Upon the sudden attack of the enemy before daylight on the 
morning of the 19th, First Lieut. Henry F. Brewerton, Fifth 
U. S. Artillery, who was in command of the battery, had the 



26 War Sketches and Incidents. 

men on the alert, and imnaediately ordered the guns to be loaded 
with cannister. * * * He succeeded in ofettino- in a few 
shots in that direction (the left) from the two pieces of his center 
section. The infantry on the left then breaking and abandoning 
their works (which were at once occupied by the enemy), Lt. 
B. turned the two pieces of his left section upon them now 
within the works, and fired at them with cannister until they had 
advanced to within twenty-five paces of his guns, when he ceased 
firing and ran the pieces by hand down the hill to the cais- 
sons. " One piece was lost. 

Captain Frank Gibbs, of Battery I, First Ohio Battery, 
reports taking position and opening tire upon the enemy. He 
was farther from the parapet and had no difficulty in getting 
away with all his guns to do good service throughout the day. 

Captain F. C. Wilkie, commanding battalion New York 
Heavy Artillery, of the First Brigade, in his report tells the 
fate of the pickets : 

"The battalion was on picket in front of the 1st Division. 
About one hour before daylight some rebel cavalry appeared 
in front of the left of the lines, but, being fired upon, retired. 
That portion of the line then deployed as skirmishers. Shortly 
after, a column of the enemy crossed the creek on the right of 
the line, was fired upon by the pickets posted there, also by the 
small reserve, but they did not return the fire. The reserve fell 
back in skirmishing order, but were unable to check in the 
slightest degree the advance of the enemy. With the excep- 
tion of about forty men capable of bearing arms the whole bat- 
talion was captured." 

Thus embraced in this paper are extracts from the reports of 
the two brigade commanders, of six out of eight regimental 
commanders, of the officer in command of the pickets, and of 
every battery commander. The report of the other regi- 
mental commander is of the same tenor, substantially, as 
those given, but is omitted for want of space. 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. 27 

At the risk of tediousness these extended quotations have 
been given, so that the condition of things behind that parapet 
just before the attack and during the struggle may be told by 
eye witnesses, as well as the events upon the picket line. 

From these witnesses, who can say with the hero of the siege 
of Troy, "All of which I saw and part of which I was," we 
learn that the pickets were on the alert and did their duty, and 
were nearly all captured ; that the firing of the pickets alarmed 
the division ; that every regiment and battery was under arms ; 
the infantry at the works and the cannoneers at their guns ; 
that a short but heroic resistance was maintained until the men 
at the breastworks were outflanked, right and left, and the 
center was penetrated ; that every gun (but two) was in action 
and well served ; that only seven guns out of sixteen were lost ; 
that the left battery was fought until the cannoneers were bay- 
oneted at their guns ; that many of the regiments retired in 
good order, and so remamed and fought until they were broken 
Tn the retiring of the Nineteenth Corps from the position at the 
pike under Gordon's assault ; that the statements of the histor- 
ians, civil and military, are false to facts, unjust and mislead- 
ing, and especially that the pickets were not overcome by strat- 
agem or deceit, but retired fighting manfully ; and that the 
Kebel advance was not first announced by volleys fired into the 
slumbering camps of the Eighth Corps, but that this division 
was under arms to receive them. 

To show that the approach of the Rebel line that foggy morn- 
ing without discovery until they were within twenty paces is 
nol to be attributed to the dullness or unwatchfulness of the 
men in those works, a quotation is inserted here from the 
report of Colonel T. W. Hyde, of First Maine, in Getty's Sec- 
ond Division of the Sixth Corps, concerning a Rebel charge 
after eight o'clock upon that division on the crescent-shaped 
rido-e west of Middletown, as follows : 



28 War Sketches and hicidents. 

" The density of the fog had allowed them to rush over our 
videttes without their being able to warn the line, and under 
cover of the steepness of the hill they approached thus near 
(thirty paces) unobserved." 

This testimony, as a whole, shows that the division was sur- 
prised and overpowered under circumstances entirely to their 
honor. 

By way of corroboratian, a quotation is now offered from 
Captain J. P. Sims, commanding the advance brigade of Ker- 
shaw's assaulting column. He says, narrating events from a 
point on the road between Strasburg and the ford : 

"Here a halt was ordered until nearly five o'clock, when I 
was ordered to move down the road until the brigade had 
crossed over, and then turn down the creek and form in line of 
battle parallel to the creek, and to advance immediately to the 
front * * * to drive the enemy's pickets in without firing 
upon them, and not fire until the enemy's line was reached, all 
of which was strictly complied with * * * receiving the 
shots from the enemy's picket line without replying, but con- 
tinuing to move forvvard with unbroken front through the vol- 
leys of musketry and cannon which they were now exposed to 
until they reached the enemy's works. The enemy made a 
stubborn resistance. Some of them were shot down while firing 
upon our men at the distance of a few feet." 

If their enemy in arms is thus generous in his tribute to their 
valor, the friends of the Eighth Corps cannot afford to perpet- 
uate an injustice. 

The writer now desires to present something of the historical 
disagreement that grew up around that most dramatic incident 
of the day, never omitted, with its varied embellishments, by 
historians and popular writers who touch upon this battle, the 
renowned "Sheridan's Ride," its precedent, attendant and suc- 
ceeding events, incidentally mentioning the fact that his rapid 
ride was limited to about ten miles rather than twenty, a cold 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. 29 

fact which takes away the most prominent feature of the cele- 
brated ))oem. 

The news of the battle was flashed over the land the next day, 
and on the 21st appeared in a hundred newspapers, and as 
many editorials set forth the idea of the battle derived from 
these first dispatches, and events occurred in so rapid succes- 
sion that there was littlu time for correction of misstatements. 

On the 21st of October, 1864, the following editorial appeared 
in the Dubuque Herald : 

"Gen. Sheridan is a great chieftain. He brings order 
out of chaos, and changes a rout into a great victory. By the 
dispatches published to-day it will be seen that when Sheridan 
reached his army he found it in full retreat, hotly pursued by 
the victorious and exulting rebels. Bat he threw himself into 
the breach, reorganized his demoralized forces, turned them 
upon the enemy, and inflicted upon him a disastrous defeat. 
His achievement is unparalleled in the annals of war, and his 
skill in inditing dispatches should cause Pope and Hooker to 
look to their laurels. When, to use his own language, ' I take 
the matter in hand (myself) the Rebels must stand from under.' " 

Notwithstanding the copper-head sneer, that was undoubtedly 
the impression produced by the telegraphic dispatches. 

In the celebrated poem, " Sheridan's Ride," so often recited 
with dramatic eft'ect, the same idea is brought out. 

"The first the General saw were the groups 
Of stragglers, and then the retreating troops. 
What was done ? What to do ? A glance told him both. 
Then striliing his spurs, with a terrible oath, 
He dashed down the line 'mid a storm of huzzas, 
And the wave of retreat checlied its course there, because 
Tlie sight of the master compelled it to pause." 

The headlines of newspaper articles and a popular poem 
impress the masses rather than prosaic history. Popular mag- 
azine articles are not read critically by the average reader. Of 



^O War Sketches and Incidents. 

this character was an article published in the Atlantic Monthly 
in 1878, volume 42, page 687, by Major Crowningshield, of 
the First Massachusetts Cavalry, and another article by Captain 
J. Franklin Fitts, of the One Hundred and Fourteenth New 
York, in the Galaxy, volume 1, page 534, before alluded to. 
The former says, " Sheridan once up with his troops, stopped 
the retreat, reformed his line of battle." Captain Fitts says, 
"Their own (rebel) army must have needed some reorganiza- 
tion ; ours was a chaotic mass of fragments, wandering in the 
woods, disheartened and bewildered, while the commanding 
oflBcers were striving to bring order out of the confusion. To 
me the task seemed hopeless, impossible. That we had been 
beaten, and severely beaten, nobody could deny." Speaking 
of Sheridan's arrival he says, "The effects of his presence soon 
manifested themselves. There was a marching and aligning for 
15 minutes and the chaos was reduced to order." 

The hard-headed and reliable writer, Horace Greeley, in his 
history of the "American Conflict," says : 

"Sheridan met his crest-fallen, shattered battalions without 
a word of reproach, but joyously, inspiringly, swinging his cap 
and shouting to the stragglers, as he rode rapidly past them, 
» Face the other way ! We are going back to our camps. We 
are going to lick them out of their boots ! ' Most of them 
obeyed, as the weaker will submits to the stronger. Then, hav- 
ing ordered each command to face to the front, form line and 
advance, he rode for two hours along that line gathering infor- 
mation and studying the ground." 

These extracts embrace what may be called the radical pro- 
Sheridan view, which gives no credit to any other of the Union 
generals. But is is noticeable that few modern writers, civil 
or military, have taken this radical pro-Sheridan view. 

If it is the wrong view, it is still being injuriously perpetuated 
through the schools, for we find Montgomery's School History 
using these words, page 315: "The retreat now became a 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. 31 

panic. Sheridan was at Winchester, about twenty miles away. 

He heard the cannon with their 

' terrible grumble and rumble and roar, 

Telling the battle was on once more.' 

Mountinof his horse, he hurried to the scene of disaster. * * * 
' We must face the other way, ' shouted Sheridan to the retreat- 
ing men. They did face the other way,'''' etc. 

We find that from Fisk's School History the boys and girls 
are learning that, "On one occasion, October 19th, while Sheri- 
dan was at Winchester, Early attacked his army at Cedar Creek, 
nearly twenty miles away. The Union Army was driven back 
about seven miles. Meanwhile Sheridan, who had heard the 
distant sound of cannon, was galloping at full speed toward the 
scene of action. As he approached the field and met squads of 
fugitives on the road he shouted, 'Turn, boys, turn; we're 
going back. ' One and all rallied to his side, and defeat was 
turned into victory. ' ' 

Let three corrections be made here. 

1. Winchester was only eleven miles from the point where 
Sheridan found Getty's Division and the cavalry and portions 
of other infantry corps in line facing the foe, instead of twenty 

miles. 

2. The Union Army was never driven back seven miles. 
The Eighth Corps was about five miles from the parapets of 
the First Division ; the Nineteenth Corps was about four miles 
back ; half of the Sixth Corps was within two miles of its 
camps, and the cavalry had not been driven at all. 

3. The retreat did not become a panic. It seems impossi- 
ble, for writers of school histories even, to avoid the romantic 
and write soberly about this battle. 

There is also the radical pro-Wright view, which accredits 
General Wright with having fought the battle with a masterly 
generalship ; that lie had not only established and 'reorganized 
the army on a new line, but had resolved to assume the offen- 



■5 2 War Sketches and Incide7its. 

sive and drive the Kebels across Cedar Creek. The supporters 
of this view are amoni^ military men as well as historians, 
although General Wight in his official report docs not claim the 
intention to assume the offensive. But it is fairly to be inferred 
that he claimed to have established the new line and to have had 
his arm}' practically formed on that line. He says in his report : 

*' Meanwhile the second division had taken up the position 
indicated, with the left resting on the pike. The Third and 
First were forming on the right, while on the Sixth Corps the 
Nineteenth was being formed. One or two very persistent 
attacks had been repulsed. About this time Major-General 
Sheridan came up and assumed command." 

Brigadier-General Getty, who was in command of the Sixth 
Corps when General Sheridan came up, says in his report : 

"On retiring from the position (on the crest west of Middle- 
town) I sent orders to the commanders of the First and Third 
Divisions to conform to the movements of the Second, and 
when this division (2nd) was halted the First and Third were 
brought up and placed on the right, the Third holding the cen- 
ter and the First the right of the corps line. General Sheridan 
reached the field between 11 and 12 o'clock." 

Colonel J. Warren Keifer, in command of the Third Divi- 
sion, in his report says : 

" From this position (the same) the division was moved under 
orders to the left and formed connection with the second divi- 
sion, Sixth Corps. * * * It was known about 10:30 a, 'm 
that Major-General Sheridan had arrived." 

Colonel R. B. Hayes, afterwards President, then in com- 
mand of the Second Division of the Eighth Corps, said to the 
Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion about 18S8, correcting 
General Sheridan as to the condition of the Eighth Corps when 
he arrived : 

"The fact is that first came Getty's Division, and then mine, 
and then came Gen'l Keifer's division, all lying down behind 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. -j^ 

barricades and in good condition, except that there had been 
some loss in the morning. Gen'l Keifer was next to me, and 
then came the rest of the Sixth Corps, and farther down I have 
no doubt the 19th Corps was in line." 

With all these officers, General Sheridan and a host of writers 
disagree as to the presence on that line of any troops to the 
right of Getty's Division, but the testimony seems to show that 
Hayes' men were there, and one-half of Keifer' s Third Divi- 
sion, but not the other half of the Third Division of the Sixth 
Corps, nor the First Division, nor the Nineteenth Corps, which 
were a thousand yards to the rear, and the Nineteenth, twelve 
hundred yards to the right. 

It is noticeable that every writer consulted who was in the 
Sixth Corps makes these strong claims for General Wright, 
their corps commander. 

The author of "Three Years in the Sixth Corps," Dr. 
Stevens, of the Seventy- seventh New York, says : 

" With this new line of battle in the strong position we now 
held, Gen'l Wright determined that not only should the 
retreat be stopped here, but the rebels should be driven back 
across Cedar Creek. Their career of victory was ended. The 
grand old Sixth Corps, directed by our own loved General Getty, 
had turned the fortunes of the day. It was now 10 o'clock; 
far away in the rear we heard cheer after cheer. What was 
the cause ? Were reenf orcements coming ? Yes ; Phil Sher- 
idan was coming, and he was a host." 

The author of "Vermont in the Civil War," G. C. Bene- 
dict, volume, 1, gives substantially the same view. 

Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Starr, of the Ninth West Virginia, 
read a paper to the Loyal Legion of Indiana in 1891, in which 
he alleged that when Sheridan arrived " He found order restored, 
our stragglers brought back, cartridges refilled, wounded taken 
care of, and strateg}^ matured by Gen. Crook for the battle 
that was to occur in the afternoon, as indicated by Crook's 



'iA War Sketches and Incidents. 

reply to Sheridan's salutation, viz. : ' We can take the offensive 
from this point and retake our camps this afternoon.' " 
Doubtless General Crook said that. Captain J. N. Patton, of 
Des Moines, who, with Major William McKinley, now presi- 
dent, was on Crook's staff that day, says that before Sheridan 
came he heard General Crook urge General Wright to advance, 
and predicted that the move would be a success because the 
Rebels were pillaging our camps and demoralized, and that he 
believes that had Crook had command he would have done it. 

Captain Patton carried the information of the attack from 
General Crook, at Bell Grove, to General Wright at his head- 
quarters across Meadow Run that morning, and, while he does 
not understand how the General could have been where he 
claims to have been beyond the pike with Hayes' Division, he 
thinks, from what he saw of him that day, that he was not 
"rattled," bat acted with judgment and military sagacity. 

The pro-Wright views given herein, which leave Sheridan 
nothing to do after his arrival but to carry out General Wright's 
design of advancing, are given in the following historical works : 
"The Civil War in America," Draper, volume 3, page 413 ; 
"The Civil War," Lossing, volume 3, page 369; Johnson's 
Universal Cyclopedia ; American supplement to Encyclopedia 
Britannica; Pollard's "Lost Cause" (Rebel), page 599. 

A third class of writers take a middle ground, and while they 
by no means accord to General Sheridan credit for stopping a 
retreating army, and allege that the retreat had ended, an4 the 
danger point had been passed, do not withhold from General 
Wright tho credit of having directed the grand tactics of the 
battle whereby the left of the army was withdrawn from the 
clutches of the Rebels, and of having established a safe line 
for defense, with, as some say, the troops that were not yet on 
that line in process of forming on it, only prevented by a tac- 
tical error committed through losing sight of forces on their 
right hidden by intervening woods. 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadlcy. ^c 

These writers credit Sheridan with completing the formation 
already begun, and making changes in the distribution of the 
cavalry, with formulating the resolution to advance, and inspir- 
ing a dispirited army with enough of his own sublime courage 
to "snatch victory from the jaws of defeat." 

These writers are both from civil and military life, the mili- 
tary writers having been in the battle. The following quota- 
tion from the report of Brevet Major-General W. H. Emory, 
of the Nineteenth Corps, is given, showing that his last move- 
ments before General Sheridan arrived were in obedience to 
Wright's design for the whole army to take position upon the 
line on which Sheridan found Getty, and that he finally reached 
his position after Sheridan arrived, and in obedience also to his 
orders. He says, speaking of the position at the Old Forge 
Road : " Here 1 ordered the Nineteenth to halt and form in line 
of battle. My first line was already in position when I was 
directed to retire inclining to the left and connecting with the 
Sixth Corps. I, however, ordered my skirmishers to hold the 
crest until they should receive instructions from me to abandon 
it. Losing sight of the Sixth Corps shortly afterward, in con- 
sequence of a sudden change of direction in the line of march, 
I ordered the Nineteenth back to the vicinity of the crest, and 
sent aides de camp to find the right of the Sixth Corps. I also 
extended my line over a portion of the unoccupied interval on 
my left in order to check the turning movement of the enemy 
who were deploying in that direction. While thus engaged, I 
received a message from General Sheridan directing me to close 
up to the Sixth Corps, etc., etc. Pushing to the left about 
three-quarters of a mile, I joined the Sixth Corps." * 

General A. Bayard Nettleton, then colonel of the Second 
Ohio Cavalry, in a paper read before the Loyal Legion of 



*It may be mentioned as a matter of interest to Iowa people tliat the following 
Iowa regiments were rendering efficient service in tliis battle, viz. : Twenty-sec- 
ond, In Second Brigade, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-eighth in Fourth Brigade, 
Second Division, Nineteenth Corps. 



^6 JVar Sketches and Incidents. 

Minnesota, said : " At noon and for some time previously the 
enemy was opposed only by Merritt's and Custer's Cavalry and 
Getty's Division and batteries, while the main portion of the 
Sixth Corps was more than two miles to the right and rear of 
Getty, engaged in reorganizing, and the Nineteenth Corps was 
to the right and rear of the Sixth." He says further of Sheri- 
dan, "He sent galloping orders to the Sixth and Nineteenth 
Corps to hasten up to our support." 

To the same general effect that Sheridan ordered at least one- 
half the Sixth Corps and all the Nineteenth Corps up from a 
very considerable distance to the rear, the writer might quote 
at length from Richard B. Irwin, of General Emory's staff, in 
his "History of the Nineteenth Corps "; J. W. De Forest, also 
of General Emory's staff, in an article in Harper's Magazine of 
April, 1865 ; Major G. A. Forsythe, who was on General 
Sheridan's staff, and made the ride with him that day, in an 
article in Harper's Magazine of July, 1897; F. H. Buffum, in his 
" History of the Fourteenth New Hampshire," the writer's own 
regiment ; Charles Carlton Coffin, in his " Freedom Triumphant," 
page 49 ; Harper's History of the Civil War ; Nicolay 
and Hay's "Abraham Lincoln," volume 9, page 323 ; Major 
H. M. Pollard, Eighth Vermont, on the staff of General 
Dwight, First Division, Nineteenth Corps, in " Recollections of 
Cedar Creek," published by Missouri Loyal Legion, volume 1, 
of "Personal Recollections," page 278. 

These quotations will, however, be closed with Sheridan's 
own words from his Memoirs, volume 2, page 82 : 

" When nearing the valley pike just south of Newtown, I saw 
about three-fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, 
which proved to be Ricket's and Whea ton's Divisions of the 
Sixth Corps, and then learned that the Nineteenth Corps had 
halted a little to the right and rear of these. * * ^^ Con- 
tinuing on parallel with the pike about midway between Newtown 
and Middletown I crossed to the west of it, and a little later 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. i^ 

came up in the rear of Getty's Division of the Sixth Corps. 
When I arrived, tliis division and the cavalry were the only 
troops in the presence of and resisting the enemy ; they were 
apparently acting as a rear guard. * * * Getty's Division 
when I found it was about a mile north of Middletown." 

As before stated, there is substantial evidence of the presence 
of one brigade of the Third Division and twelve hundred of 
Crook's men. General Sheridan did not go down the line to 
the west far enough to distinguish them from the Second 
Division. 

He says farther on : "I had already decided to attack the 
enemy from that line as soon as I could get matters in shape to 
take the offensive. Crook met me at this time and strongly 
favored my idea of attackmg, * * * Gen'l Wright came 
up later. * * * Wright gave me a hurried account of the 
day's events and when told we would fight the enemy on the line 
which Getty and the cavalry were holding, and that he must go 
himself and send all his staff to bring up the troops, he zealously 
fell in with the scheme ; and it was then that the Nineteenth 
and two divisions of the Sixth were ordered to the front from 
where they had halted to the right and rear of Getty." 

When the statements of actors in these historical scenes are 
so contradictory, it is not surprising that historians are equally 
at variance in their versions of the affair. 

To the great majority of readers these contradictions are 
exceedingly perplexing, and the conclusion is almost inevitable 
that some have blundered or colored their statements for a 
purpose. 

After prolonged and patient study of the official records and 
semi-official accounts by participants, the writer is unable to 
reconcile the reports of Generals Wright and Getty and Colonel 
Keifer to the effect that the new line was fully formed and 
ready, with the statements of General Emory, De Forest and 
Irwin of his staff, and Major For sy the of Sheridan's, staff and of 



38 War Sketches and Incidents. 

General Sheridan himself, to the effect that the greater part of 
the Sixth Corps and the Nineteenth Corps were from one 
thousand yards to two miles to the rear and right of the troops 
in line north of Middletown when Sheridan came up, to be yet 
brought up by him, except upon the hypothesis that Wright, 
Getty and Keifer regarded their advance to that line as the com- 
pletion of a tactical move ordered by General Wright, acci- 
dently interrupted by the excusable failure to connect with 
Getty's Division as they marched to the rear through woodland, 
a closing up which would have occurred about as it did at all 
events. 

This view exonerates all these brave and heroic men from 
blame and from any suspicion of "doctoring" their reports. 

Between the views of those whom we may, without intend- 
ing to be offensive, call the partisans of General Wright, the 
theory of complete reorganization of an army not demoralized 
or routed in fact, with the present ability and intention to 
advance, and the other view of the early writers who were 
partisans of General Sheridan, there is a broad difference. But 
it seems to the writer that the preponderance of testimony must 
govern, which will assign the truth to the middle ground hon- 
orable to both, "/w medias res tutissimus ibis,'''' or, you go 
safest in the middle of the road. 

Therefore we conclude that the evidence goes to show, on the 
one hand, that though the army was surprised before daylight 
and was driven back after a stubborn resistance, or went back 
for tactical reasons, it was not routed, nor did the hero of the 
day ride but a fraction over one-half of the "twenty miles" of 
the poem. 

It goes to show, on the other hand, that though the army 
was practically intact, it was not yet completely reformed when 
Sheridan arrived, and to advance is not shown to have entered 
into General Wright's plans, although while it has been stated 
in some quarters that he was organizing the army for further 



Address by Captain E. D. Hadley. -jg 

retreat, he does say in his report, " that there was no intention 
of retreating the soldiers who stood fire clearly understood." 

It goes to show that though the poem, " Sheridan's Ride," 
and various historical statements are " figments of the brain," as 
to time, distance and all details, the true story of the day will 
reveal Sheridan in a grand and admirable role, which, for the 
permanence of his well deserved fame won on many other fields, 
needs no exaggeration of his achievements at the expense of 
others. 

With great satisfaction the writer quotes the autograph letter 
of President Lincoln : 

Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 22, 1864. 
Major-General Sheridan : 

With great pleasure I tender to you and your brave army the thanks 
of the Nation, and my own personal admiration and gratitude, for the 
month's operations in the Shenandoah Valley, and especially for the 
splendid work of October 19, 1864. 

Your ob't servant, 

Abraham Lincoln. 



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